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Abstract 
Quite contrary to the belief that South-South cooperation supplements North-South cooperation, it is not yet in a position to 
replace it in any significant way. In fact, there are still a lot of North-South development cooperation projects with signs that 
northern partners are overtly willing to transform unequal North-South engagement partnerships into what is now often referred 
to as ‘true partnerships’. Denmark’s historical cooperation ties with South Africa, for instance, are now narrowing in on the clean 
energy sector, with an agreement signed on 4 March 2013 between the two governments, whereby Denmark has given its 
commitment to help South Africa achieve low carbon economic growth by 2020. The Americans, who took the lead in promoting 
development cooperation projects in developing countries, way back in 1949 through President Truman’s ‘Bold New Program,’ 
have openly shifted their ‘pivot’ from Middle East to Asia in the present century through “increased investment”—diplomatic, 
economic and strategic, in an attempt to reassure ‘old allies’ that Washington will always stand by while reinforcing its 
commitment to actively engage with the region through multilateral organizations. In the maritime arena, for instance, the US 
unequivocally came down on side of the ASEAN members, party to the conventional South China Sea dispute, by openly 
criticizing Chinese assertiveness, by holding military exercises with Vietnam and the Philippines and affirming the capability of 
the US-Philippine alliance in the South China Sea arena. Washington is playing the pivotal role in chalking out the most 
comprehensive and far-reaching trade and investment agreement involving Asia-Pacific states, the Trans Pacific Partnership, that 
has swelled from four to 11 members presently. In tackling unconventional security threat problems like sea piracy and maritime 
terrorism, the US has undertaken several initiatives with littoral countries of Southeast Asia and India, well reflective of the 
growing maturity in North-South cooperation projects in the 21st century. The present paper is an attempt to examine the North-
South cooperative projects in the maritime domain of Southeast Asia where the 10-membered Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) have welcomed USA’s ‘pivot’ to Asia as counterbalance against an aggressive China, and the “ ASEAN 
Way,” “Asian Way,” or “Asia Pacific Way” of multilateralism,” that involves conscious rejection by Asian leaders and policy 
elites of “imported models” of multilateralism and their call for liberalism that conforms to local realities and practices.  
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1. Introduction 
Amitav Acharya in his seminal book ‘The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia,’ defined 
regionness as a contested notion where there are a number of ways in which regionness can be explored, identified 
and established, but no single attempt is likely to prove definitive and universally acceptable. While Cantori and 
Spiegel in their classic study on ‘regional sub-systems’ identified geographic proximity, international interaction, 
common bonds including ethnic, cultural, social and historical as necessary attributes of regionalism, Russett in 
another well-known study set five criteria—social and cultural homogeneity, political attitudes, institutions, 
economic interdependence and geographical proximity as distinctive features of regionness. i 
The proliferation of regional organizations in an institutional form since 1945 has been one of the most 
significant developments of neo-liberalism of contemporary international relations. A number of security agencies 
such as NATO, SEATO and the WARSAW pact were initiated along with numerous regional economic and social 
organizations, especially in Western Europe—the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel 
Community, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Colombo Plan of South Asia, to 
name a few.  Although it is a truism that regionalism in the post World War II era lacked its effective universalism 
and collective self as states were busy band wagoning with either of the great powers—the United States of America 
or the erstwhile Soviet Union. Better termed as ‘North-South’ cooperation, the Marshall Plan and the ‘Point Four’ of 
President Truman’s 1949 ‘Bold New Program’ sowed the seeds for economic assistance to the war-devastated 
economies of the third world countries. From the early 1960s to the mid 1970s, there was a significant growth in 
multilateral development programs- this multilateralism being ‘aided’ by four major institutions—the International 
Development Association (IDA) attached to the World Bank; the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB); the cooperation fund of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP).ii 
2. The North-South and South-South Cooperation 
The new North-South relationships did in many ways move away from the donor-recipient relationship into 
partnerships with shared ownership and decision-making. The Non-governmental Organizations played an important 
role in transforming unequal relationships into authentic partnerships of mutual respect, trust and accountability. 
Whether it was global recession, climate change debate or persisting levels of high poverty in the global South, 
‘partnerships’ in relation to development came to particular prominence in the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) report Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development 
Cooperation. It argued that aid should focus on a limited list of poverty reduction and human development goals—
an approach that was further endorsed by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda 
for Action (2008).iii 
Gradually the South realized that its ‘over-dependence’ on the North for financial help brought in threats of 
unequal power balance, incompatible goals and opinions and lack of long-term perspectives- an unequal vertical 
donor-recipient approach to aid giving between the two. Ergo, the concept of South-South cooperation (SSC) gained 
prominence among the newly industrialized countries of the South, whose economic strength matched more equally 
than their asymmetric North-South relationships. 
Way back in 1995 at the Bandung Conference, Indonesia set out plans for economic and social cooperation 
between Asia and Africa. Some 29 countries representing more than half the world's population sent delegates, 
condemning "colonialism in all of its manifestations": SSC being more than just another aid modality endorsing 
generous financial help, exchange of experts, technical assistance, exchange of goods and services, information on 
best practices and initiation to increase joint-negotiation capacities. In 1972 a working group on Technical 
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Cooperation among developing countries was established by the UN General Assembly. In the late 1970s the UN 
created a special Unit for SSC which promoted more South-South trade and investment: in 1989, the Non-Aligned 
countries set up the Group for South-South Consultation and Coordination (G-15). In 2000, The Group of 77, an 
alliance of developing countries in the UN was established. The alliance prioritized technology transfer and skill 
development, literacy, elimination of trade barriers and promoting direct investments. It also highlighted the need 
for assistance programs to eradicate hunger and HIV/AIDs including debt relief, tourism and sustainability. In 
December 2003, the UN General Assembly declared 19th December the annual UN Day for South-South 
Cooperation. It also promoted setting up of the SSC Fund by the UN Development Program- as the fund 
supplemented unilateral efforts by individual countries like China, India, Brazil and Japan to assist less developed 
Southern nations of Africa, Haiti and South Pacific nations.  iv 
Of course SSC is not without weaknesses. First is the inevitable problem of definition. SSC is estimated to be 
worth between $10-15 billion a year, but almost all of this is accounted for by five or six emerging powers including 
China, Venezuela, Turkey and India, not to mention well established non-OECD donors like Saudi Arabia, 
estimated to give more than $5 billion a year. Second, the habit of splitting aid into two categories- traditional ‘aid 
donors’ and south-south cooperation is no longer useful.  Quite contrary to the belief that South-South cooperation 
supplements North-South cooperation, there are still a lot of North-South development cooperation projects with 
signs that northern partners are overtly willing to transform unequal North-South engagement partnerships into what 
is now often referred to as ‘true partnerships’. Denmark’s historical cooperation ties with South Africa, for instance, 
are now narrowing in on the clean energy sector, with an agreement signed on 4 March 2013 between the two 
governments, whereby Denmark has given its commitment to help South Africa achieve low carbon economic 
growth by 2020. The Americans, who took the lead in promoting development cooperation projects in developing 
countries, way back in 1949 have openly shifted their ‘pivot’ from Middle East to Asia in the present century 
through “increased investment”—diplomatic, economic and strategic, in an attempt to reassure ‘old allies’ that 
Washington will always stand by while reinforcing its commitment to actively engage with the region through 
multilateral organizations. Moreover, the notion that southern governments are more likely to have the needs of the 
poorest at heart is a ‘cliché’ since southern governments themselves led or been complicit in policies that have run 
the poor into the ground. The demarcations of Special Economic Zones in China have displaced thousands from the 
rural area; Thai rice have been reducing rice prices in West Africa and putting local farmers out of work. The SSC in 
Latin America and Caribbean is motivated more by foreign policy objectives- in the Brazilian case, for instance, it is 
a wider agenda for regional stability, security, trade and Brazil’s aspirations as a regional leader and global actor. 
Venezuelan aid through ALBA is attached to geopolitical alignments and highly ideological agendas, while 
Mexican cooperation with Central America is related to security concerns on its southern borders. It is also difficult 
to ignore the strong asymmetries of power within the region- the relationship between Brazil and Bolivia or Haiti, or 
between Venezuela and the small open economies of the Caribbean which are highly vulnerable to oil shocks. 
So, now that we have realized that both North-South and south-south cooperation can coexist in a constructive 
world where globalization has reduced the relative distance between people and spaces and regionalization is “the 
integration across national borders within a macro-region, of markets for goods, capital, services, knowledge and 
labour. It is clearly a political project but not necessarily state-led. It also refers to the relative convergence of 
cultural affinity, political regimes, security arrangements and economic policies and the creation of a regional 
identity- where cooperating states based on their feelings of solidarity, community and loyalty can form a collective 
identity. 
The present paper is an attempt to examine the North-South cooperative projects in the maritime domain of 
Southeast Asia where the 10-membered Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have welcomed USA’s 
‘pivot’ to Asia as counterbalance against an aggressive China, and the “ ASEAN Way,” “Asian Way,” or “Asia 
Pacific Way” of multilateralism,” that involves conscious rejection by Asian leaders and policy elites of “imported 
models” of multilateralism and their call for liberalism that conforms to local realities and practices.   
3. US ‘Pivot’ to Asia and its involvement in the Conventional and Unconventional Domain of Southeast Asia    
Since the US President Barack Obama announced his ‘pivot’ from the Middle East to Asia through “increased 
investment”—diplomatic, economic and strategic in an attempt to reassure ‘old allies’ that Washington will no 
longer stand by while China eats America’s lunch in Asia on the one hand, while on the other , it reinforces 
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America’s commitment to actively engage itself with the region through ASEAN; ASEAN having hailed its 
decision as a hedge against military China’s aggressive postures to claim territories across the region, while keeping 
its hold as the ‘central foci’ between these rising powers.  
According to John Lee, ASEAN’s preference for USA has arisen from the fact that: 
a) China has land and maritime disputes with a number of Asian countries, including Japan, India and several states 
in the South China Sea. In contrast, the United States does not have any such outstanding dispute with these 
countries; b) Second, free and open trade has depended heavily on US naval power and the US led hub-and spokes 
defence structure for more than five decades. Here, China’s revisionist tendencies and even attempts to dismantle 
this regional security interaction with the US will act to its disadvantage strategically; c) third, the fact that US is not 
geographically based in Asia, works to its advantage. As a foreign leader, it requires to take the permission of Asian 
partners to retain its presence in the region. If asked to shift bases, America will do so peacefully. In contrast, a 
dominant Asian power would not need the same level of regional acquiescence to maintain its military foothold; d) 
as a trading partner, the problem is that as much as 2/3rd of China’s trade with East and Southeast Asia is in 
‘processing trade’ items, with 2/3rd of all finished products heading to America and Europe. China’s domestic 
consumer market is about US$1.5 trillion and the EU’s of US$11.5 trillion. For Asian exporting countries, the 
combined US and EU consumption market of around US$25 trillion remains far more important than the Chinese 
one. Overall, ASEAN, as a group, has expressed its keenness to restore a “dynamic equilibrium” with ‘no single 
power’ dominance in the region. While, with US, it has warmly welcomed American activism and involvement with 
the Southeast Asian countries; with China, ASEAN has been insistent on endorsing a new protocol concerning a 
Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ), including agreeing on interpreting the maritime 
continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zones; a binding Code-of-Conduct (CoC) on the South China Sea, where 
all ASEAN countries including China have been asked to abide by the agreement (during the ASEAN-China 
Summit in November 2011, China agreed to participate in formulating such an agreement). In a nutshell, one 
observes little or ‘no change’ in ASEAN playing the pivotal role as the ‘driving force,’ the ‘wise counsellor’ of the 
already existing superpower and the newly emerging powers across the region.v 
ASEAN has also staidly welcomed the US driven Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) initiative, which is being 
tagged as a ‘high quality 21st century Free Trade Agreement’ including not just trade in goods, services and 
investment but also intellectual property rights, labour, environment, small and medium enterprises. The trade 
agreement currently under negotiation between 11 countries in three continents includes Australia, Brunei, Chile, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States and Vietnam. In late 2011 three additional countries- Japan, 
Canada and Mexico announced their intention to join the pact. 
As in the conventional maritime, in tackling unconventional security problems like sea piracy and maritime 
terrorism, the US has undertaken several initiatives with littoral countries of Southeast Asia and India, well It said, 
“The US recognizes that the littoral states along the Straits—Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia—have special 
rights and responsibilities for maintaining the security of the Straits; each participating nation will define how much, 
if any RMSI activity will take place within its waters.” reflective of the growing maturity in North-South 
cooperation projects in the 21st century. The Container Security Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative and 
the Regional Maritime Security Initiatives have been undertaken to ensure the security of the littorals straddling the 
Malacca Straits. In each case “US recognizes that the littoral states along the Straits—Singapore, Malaysia and 
Indonesia—have special rights and responsibilities for maintaining the security of the Straits, with each participating 
nation defining how much activity will take place within its waters.” Besides maritime initiatives, USA along with 
India has undertaken joint escort duties- Sharde, Malabar series along the Malacca Straits to attest the safety of the 
ships using these narrow straits. 
In many ways, ASEAN in the maritime arena has successfully established its role as the hub of regional 
multilateral diplomacy—to the extent of reflecting the glimpses of an ‘ascendant security community;’vi ascendant 
security community being defined by Emanuel Adler and Michael Burnett as an evolutionary concept, where inter-
state ties through institutions and organizations have given rise to a sense of trust and embryonic expectations of 
peaceful change.vii 
 
4. Conclusion 
Overall, multilateralism which refers to collective, cooperative action by states, whether vertical or horizontal, 
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will largely be ‘issue based’ in the 21st century as unconventional threats to human safety- terrorism, poverty, 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, environmental protection, sustainability of resources require joint action to reduce 
costs and bring order to international relations. Such problems cannot be addressed unilaterally with optimum 
effectiveness. The rationale persists because all states, including non-state actors, face mutual vulnerabilities and 
intensifying interdependence. They will benefit from global public goods, where even the most powerful state 
cannot achieve security nor maintain prosperity and health as effectively while acting unilaterally or in isolation. So 
the international system has to rest on network of treaties, regimes and shared practices at micro and macro levels, 
amidst great and small powers, small and medium powers to embody common expectations, reciprocity and 
equivalence of benefits. 
Of course in the conventional arena of defence and militarisation, the effectiveness of formal multilateral 
institutions will be inevitably conditioned and constrained by the exigencies of power.  In the Asian context, for 
instance multilateral security consultations constantly emphasize the importance of the “comfort level” among 
participants, arguing that contentious issues should be dropped from an agenda rather than risk stimulating tension. 
“The ASEAN Way,” “Asian Way,” or “Asia Pacific Way” of multilateralism,” says Amitav Acharya can be found 
in the conscious rejection by Asian leaders and policy elites of “imported models” of multilateralism and in their call 
for liberalism to conform to local realities and practices. viii  Thus, while many Asian countries harbour deep 
misgivings about China’s role, China is never described as a “threat.” Similarly, many Asian countries refuse to 
acknowledge the existence of an arms race in the region, despite a dramatic rise in defence expenditure and arms 
purchases. It is for this same reason that there has been little support for the advocacy of an ‘Asian NATO,’ as 
proponents of collective defence would dilute Asia’s vigour and vision of a secured region with economic stability 
and a socio-cultural identity of its own: the same mentality being applicable in the Eurasian, European, American 
and Arctic context where regionalism will be strictly fostered by power equations.   
 
References 
                                                        
 
i Amitav Acharya, (2000), The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia, Oxford University Press.  
 
ii Peter Rossel and Verniers (2013), Approaches to North-South, South-South and North-South-South Collaboration, 
www.uhasselt.be/Documents/Policy Paper_NSS-1.pdf. 
iii Ibid. 
iv wbi.worldbank.org. 
v John  Lee  (2011), “China Still Has a Long Way to go,” Asia-Pacific Bulletin, EastWestcentre.org.  
 
vi Amrita Dey (2012), Sea Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in South and Southeast Asia: Implications for Regional Organizations, Minerva 
Publications. 
 
vii Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, ed. (1998), Security Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge   University Press 
 
viii Amitav Acharya (1997),   Multilateralism: Is There an Asia-Pacific Way? NBR Analysis, Vol.8, No.2, http://www.nbr.org.  
 
